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SafeJS: Hermetic Sandboxing for JavaScript
Damien Cassou Stéphane Ducasse Nicolas Petton
Abstract
Isolating programs is an important mechanism to support more secure applica-
tions. Isolating program in dynamic languages such as JavaScript is even more
challenging since reflective operations can circumvent simple mechanisms that
could protect program parts. In this article we present SafeJS, an approach and
implementation that offers isolation based on separate sandboxes and control of
information exchanged between them.
In SafeJS, sandboxes based on web workers do not share any data. Data ex-
changed between sandboxes is solely based on strings. Using different policies,
this infrastructure supports the isolation of the different scripts that usually popu-
late web pages. A foreign component cannot modify the main DOM tree in unex-
pected manner.
Our SafeJS implementation is currently being used in an industrial setting in
the context of the Resilience FUI 12 project.
1 Introduction
A mashup is a web page aggregating multiple sources of information. In a JavaScript-
based mashup, such a source of information often requires including an external script
in the hosting web page for data retrieval or UI building. Including a JavaScript script
from an external source into a web page raises security concerns, as well as unresolved
questions about secure communication between the script and the hosting web page.
JavaScript semantics is permissivewith respects to security [MT09,GSK10,RHBV11].
Several attempts to isolate JavaScript programs have been made : Caja [MSL+08],
FBJS1, AdSafe [PEGK11]. These solutions either use a subset of JavaScript or rely on
code rewriting.
Our approach is based on separate thread-based local sandboxes and controlled
policies to access the main environment. On this aspect, the idea is close to the one of
Software Isolation Processes (SIP) of Singularity OS [HL07]. SafeJS is available for
download under a free open-source license.2
The contributions of this technical report are:
• strong isolation of JavaScript based on web workers ;
• fully working implementation used in an industrial setting.
1a subset of JavaScript for Facebook
2https://gitorious.org/safe-js/safe-js
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2 DOM and Web Workers
This section presents some web standards (DOM and web workers) that are key to
SafeJS design and implementation. The DOM is the document tree of any XML and
HTML document. The DOM is virtually used by all web applications. The web worker
is an infrastructure to run isolated processes in a web page. The web worker draft
specification is already implemented by modern web browsers.
DOM. The W3C defines the DOM (Document Object Model) as “an application
programming interface (API) for HTML and XML documents” [ABC+98]. The DOM
specification consists of 3 stacked levels, each level building on the level below. The
DOM Level 1, provides an API to let developers add, modify and delete elements from
an HTML (in fact any XML) document. The DOM represents any HTML document
like a tree of node objects, each object representing a particular tag of the document. In
its Level 2, the DOM additionally specifies how developers can manipulate other parts
of HTML documents such as CSS and mouse events. The DOM Level 3 adds other
APIs such as a keyboard event handling API and an XML serialization API. JavaScript
applications manipulate the DOM (e.g., adding and removing nodes) to impact the
visual representation of the web page.
Web Workers. The W3C is in the process of specifying a worker API that “allows
Web application authors to spawn background workers running scripts in parallel to
their main page”3. This draft specification enforces that the code executing within a
worker is completely isolated from the main thread and other workers: a worker can
only communicate through string-based messages, i.e., a worker has no access to the
DOM API and thus can not modify the web document. In the following, we will talk
about the “worker specification” even though this document is still in a draft stage and
subject to change. Still, this document is sufficiently advanced to have compatible
implementations in all modern web browsers.
The idea behind SafeJS is to run each unsafe script inside its own worker and give
this worker a virtual DOM for the script to play with. This virtual DOM is compatible
with the standard DOM but restricts which changes impact the document.
3 SafeJS runtime overview
Figure 1 summarizes the high-level architecture of SafeJS. A standard web browser
provides a view of the web document, a main JavaScript thread, and a DOM (accessible
from the main JavaScript thread). The web developer must include the SafeJS library
inside the document and pass each unsafe script he wants to embed in the document
to SafeJS. As soon as an unsafe script is passed to SafeJS, SafeJS creates a dedicated
JavaScript worker (step 1.). This worker first creates a SafeJS Virtual DOM (known
as the SafeJS VDOM) mimicking the main JavaScript thread’s DOM (step 2.). The
worker then loads and starts the unsafe script (step 3.). The unsafe script can freely
3http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/workers.html
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Figure 1: High-level architecture of SafeJS
read from the SafeJS VDOM. The unsafe script can also update the SafeJS VDOM
(step 4.). When this happens, the SafeJS VDOM writes a message to the message
queue (step 5.). The SafeJS library then reads the message at the other end of the
queue (step 6.). When SafeJS detects a forbidden update, SafeJS will either ignore the
request or kill the worker and its malicious script; this choice depends on the SafeJS
configuration. If the update is authorized, SafeJS performs the equivalent update on
the real DOM (step 7.). The web browser finally updates the web page (step 8.).
We now detail each step.
Step 0. – Initializing SafeJS
The web developer must first load the SafeJS library through RequireJS:4
<script type=’text/javascript’ data-main="safe" src=’js/require.js’ />
The data-main declaration instructs RequireJS to load SafeJS. The next step for the
web developer is to pass each unsafe script to SafeJS:
<script type=’text/safe-javascript’ src=’js/spy.js’ node=’#unsafeDiv’ policy=’read-write’ />
This declaration instructs SafeJS to load the unsafe js/spy.js script. This script can
be any JavaScript code compatible with client-side usage. The type parameter value
must be set to text/safe-javascript: this prevents the web browser from loading the script
in the main thread and this indicates to SafeJS that the script must be sandboxed. The
node parameter indicates the HTML target node which will be made accessible from
the unsafe script: in this case, the HTML node with the unsafeDiv id. This target node
will become the only node visible from the spy.js unsafe script. The policy parameter in-
dicates the kind of operations the unsafe script can apply on the target node. A read-only
policy only grants reading capabilities of the target node to the unsafe script whereas
a read-write policy grants full privileges to this node. Finally, the web developer must
include the HTML target node that the unsafe script will read and update:
<div id="unsafeDiv"></div>
4http://requirejs.org/
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Step 1. – Creating the worker
When SafeJS is loaded, it navigates the DOM to find any script declaration with the
text/safe-javascript type and creates a dedicated worker for each. Each worker is initial-
ized with a SafeJS jail.js script that waits for its configuration by reading its message
queue. No other form of communication is allowed by the worker draft specification
between the main thread and the worker.
Step 2. – Creating the SafeJS VDOM
The message queue only accepts strings. SafeJS must then serialize each message go-
ing through the queue: we use JSON5 as the serialization format. The first message
SafeJS sends to the worker is a copy of the HTML target node, unsafeDiv in our exam-
ple. With this message, the worker creates a SafeJS VDOM that mimics a real DOM
but that can not directly impact the web document.
Step 3. – Loading the unsafe script
After the SafeJS VDOM is created, SafeJS sends the URL of the unsafe script to load
(js/spy.js in our example) to the worker through the message queue. When the worker
receives this message, it loads the unsafe script.
Step 4. – Reading from and updating the SafeJS VDOM
The unsafe script can use the SafeJS VDOM as if it was a real DOM. Because of this,
our approach allows any script to be embedded in a web page with no modification. For
the unsafe script, reading and updating the SafeJS VDOM is done using the standard
JavaScript API. Because the SafeJS VDOM contains a (partial) copy of the web page,
reading is done without any communication with the main thread.
Step 5. – Writing to the message queue
When the unsafe script updates the SafeJS VDOM, the worker sends a serialization of
the change to the message queue. This change information contains the state of the
SafeJS VDOM as the unsafe script would like it to be.
Step 6. – Reading from the message queue
Then, SafeJS deserializes the change and checks the policy to verify whether the
change is allowed. If the change is not allowed, SafeJS can either kill the worker
or ignore the update request depending on its configuration.
Step 7. – Safely updating the DOM
If the change is allowed, SafeJS updates the real DOM. SafeJS then sends a (partial)
copy of the DOM to the worker which then updates its SafeJS VDOM.
5http://json.org/
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Step 8. – Updating the web document
When SafeJS updates the real DOM, the web browser takes care of updating the web
document.
4 Architecture of the SafeJS VDOM
The SafeJS VDOM is a full-JavaScript implementation of the DOM [ABC+98] level
3. SafeJS VDOM is actually a fork of the well-known jsdom DOM implementation6
that is used with Node.js by server-side JavaScript applications.7 Our SafeJS VDOM
implementation is available under a free open-source license.8
In this section, we present some of the key differences between SafeJS VDOM and
jsdom and explain why they are critical for SafeJS.
Replace the dependency manager
The jsdom library depends on multiple other JavaScript libraries such as htmlparser2
and contextify. These dependent libraries are resolved and loaded with a specific in-
struction that blocks the execution until the library is ready to be used:
defaultParser = require(htmlparser2)
... code that uses ’defaultParser’...
If this blocking code is perfectly valid for a server-side JavaScript application, a
web browser only allows non-blocking code and there is no way to force the browser
to wait for anything: the web browser would kill any script with an active waiting
loop for example. We thus had to rewrite all similar code to use an equivalent and
non-blocking function using RequireJS to resolve and load external libraries:
define(["htmlparser2"], function(defaultParser)
... code that uses ’defaultParser’...
)
Remove accesses to the file-system jsdom features the ability to read and write files
on the hosting file system, thanks to a dedicated API provided by node.js. Such un-
restricted access to a file system is not possible in a web browser so we removed this
ability in SafeJS VDOM.
Remove references to the global object jsdom uses Contextify, a C++ library, to
bind the pseudo variable this to its window object. In SafeJS VDOM, we can not depend
on a C++ library and we thus had to create a global object that mimics the behavior
of window. Because window is, for example, responsible for providing a logger object
(known as the console), the SafeJS VDOM global object also provides a virtual logger
object.
6https://github.com/tmpvar/jsdom
7http://nodejs.org/
8https://gitorious.org/jsdom-client/jsdom-client
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Recursively apply these changes to jsdom dependencies Finally, we applied the
above-mentioned changes to the jsdom dependencies we had to integrate in SafeJS
VDOM (e.g., cssom, cssstyle and htmlparser). For this, we leveraged the browserify
tool9 to
5 Conclusion
In this document we reported on the design and implementation of SafeJS, an hermetic
sandboxing mechanism for JavaScript. SafeJS allows mashup JavaScript developers to
include external (potentially unsafe) scripts into a web page without risking data leaks
from the web page to the external scripts. Our approach is based on web workers, a
draft specification to run isolated processes in a web page.
The idea behind SafeJS is to run each unsafe script inside its own worker and give
this worker a virtual DOM for the script to play with. This virtual DOM is compatible
with the standard DOM but restricts which changes impact the document.
Our SafeJS implementation is currently being used in an industrial setting in the
context of the Resilience FUI 12 project.
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